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HIS Article discusses case developments in the Texas law of com-
mercial transactions that were reported during the 1982 survey pe-
riod. In addition, for the convenience of those who regularly
practice in the area of commercial law, recent publications of special inter-
est are collected in the accompanying footnote.' 1982 produced no legisla-
ti',e developments to report in this Article. The organization of this Article
follows the topical outline of the Uniform Commercial Code.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Accord and Satisfaction
A recurring situation in the law of commercial transactions is the debtor
who sends to a creditor a check marked "payment in full." The creditor
then indorses and cashes the check, sometimes crossing out the "payment
in full" language and marking it "accepted under protest." The legal issue
is simple to state: Has there been a valid accord and satisfaction between
the parties? The solution is not so simple. Common law recognized a
valid accord and satisfaction on these facts and provided the debtor with
an affirmative defense if the creditor should later sue for an alleged re-
maining balance due.3 Texas, as well as a majority of American jurisdic-
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (1982) (projected nine-vol-
ume treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code); 3 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE (1981) (good reference work for research under the new Bankruptcy Code); SHEP-
HARD'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CITATIONS (1982) (useful addition to Shephard's se-
ries permitting statute-to-case research on Uniform Commercial Code subjects); STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TEXAS (2d ed. 1981) (two-volume treatment of the major
Texas commercial, lien, and lending statutes).
2. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966.
1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 721, §§ 1-101 to 10-105, at 1-182. In 1967 it became part of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 785, §§ 1-6, at 2343-2621.
As amended, the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code now conforms closely to
the 1972 official text. In this Article all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code as
enacted in chapters 1 through 11 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code [hereinafter
referred to as the Code]. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
3. Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 172, 179 N.E. 373, 375 (1932); see
Gold, Accord and Satisfaction by Estoppel, 27 IowA L. REV. 31 (1941-1942) (common law
rules and copious citation of authority on accord and satisfaction in check situation).
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tions, adopted this general rule.4
The Uniform Commercial Code casts doubt on the continuing vitality of
the common law accord and satisfaction rule. Section 1.207 of the Code
provides that "[a] party who with explicit reservation of rights . . . assents
to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does
not thereby prejudice the rights reserved." 5 The interpretation of this lan-
guage has been extremely divergent. Some courts hold that this provision
does not explicitly displace the common law rule, and that the pre-Code
accord and satisfaction doctrine still controls.6 Other courts read the sec-
tion as a legislative reversal of the pre-Code law and hold that a creditor
can accept a "payment in full" check under protest and later sue for any
balance due without facing an accord and satisfaction defense.7
In Hixson v. Cox 8 the Dallas court of appeals held that the pre-Code
accord and satisfaction rule continued to apply in Texas, at least in cases
involving payment by check for services rendered. 9 The court left open
the possibility of a different result in cases involving the sale of goods,
because such sales are within the scope of the Code.' 0 The court failed to
note, however, that any payment by check is within the scope of the Code,
regardless of whether it is for goods or services." While the rationale of
Hixson is not entirely satisfactory, the case does address the effect of the
Code on the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction and repre-
sents an advance over the earlier decision in Roylex, Inc. v. S, & B. Engi-
neers, Inc. ,i2 which merely applied pre-Code law without consideration of
possible Code modifications.' 3
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
Statute of Frauds-Signed Writing. The statute of frauds requirements for
the sale of goods are found in section 2.201 of the Code.' 4 The basic rule
states that in contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more the
contract is not enforceable unless there is a writing to evidence the sale
4. First State Bank v. Knapp, 3 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no writ);
see Gold, supra note 3, at 3 1.
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
6. See, e.g., Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61,
184 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439 (1982); Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312, 314
(Fla. 1981).
7. See, e.g., Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 519, 522, 114
Misc.2d 828 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1982); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490, 492 (S.D. 1976).
8. 633 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
9. Id. at 33 1.
10. Id.,"see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
11. 633 S.W.2d at 330.
12. 592 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
13. See id; see also Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
35 Sw. L.J. 191, 193-94 (1981) (discussion of Roylex).
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.' 5 Applying this
rule, the court in Martco, Inc. v. Doran Chevrolet, Inc. 16 held that a signed
bid worksheet submitted to a buyer for preliminary consideration could
not be used as evidence that a sale had occurred, but could only be used to
show that the parties contemplated a future transaction.' 7 The court rec-
ognized that this was a case of first impression in Texas,' 8 but cited numer-
ous cases from other jurisdictions to support its conclusion that writings in
confirmation of a contract must look backward, not forward, in time.' 9
The decision in Martco is a sensible interpretation of the basic rule of sec-
tion 2.201.
Statute of Frauds-Goods Received and Accepted. In addition to the basic
"signed writing" rule, section 2.201 permits enforcement of a contract for
the sale of goods without a writing when one or more exceptional circum-
stances occur.20 One such circumstance is the receipt and acceptance of
goods by a buyer. 2' The Code waives the writing requirement in this in-
stance because there is other objective evidence to show that a real transac-
tion occurred between the parties. In Stone v. Metro Restaurant Supply
Inc. 22 the court properly applied the "received and accepted" exception to
hold a buyer who had received and retained commercial kitchen equip-
ment liable for the purchase price of the equipment despite the lack of a
signed writing. 23
Statute of Frauds-Formation-Remedies. The most comprehensive sales
decision reported during the survey period is Dura- Wood Treating Co. v.
Century Forest Industries, Inc. 24 In Dura- Wood a merchant-buyer orally
agreed to purchase railroad ties from a merchant-seller. The buyer con-
firmed the agreement by a letter to the seller, which read: "Confirming our
conversation, please enter our order of 20,000 6 x 8- 8'6" No. 3 hardwood
ties at $8.60 each. These are to be treated with creosote coal-tar solution.
We will advise instructions just as soon as we get some releases on the
job."'25 The seller, who was aware that the buyer had a contract to resell
the ties to a third party, never signed any letter or other document evidenc-
ing the agreement. A few months later the seller cancelled the buyer's
15. Id § 2.201(a).
16. 632 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
17. Id at 929.
18. Id at 928.
19. Id at 929.
20. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(1)-(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The
rule does not apply if: (i) the contract is for goods specially manufactured for the buyer, id§ 2.201(c)(1); (2) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits to the contract in
pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court, id § 2.201(c)(2); or (3) the buyer pays for the
goods and seller accepts payment, id § 2.201(c)(3); and (4) the buyer receives and accepts
the goods, id
21. Id § 2.201(c)(3).
22. 629 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Id at 257.
24. 675 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. Id at 747.
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order because of cost increases. From July through December of 1978 the
buyer urged the seller to retract its cancellation, but to no avail. Shipments
to the third party were to begin in February of 1979 and, in order to meet
this obligation, the buyer decided to manufacture the ties in its own facility
as a means of cover. The buyer fulfilled its third-party contract during
February through June of 1979 and then sued the defaulting seller for
breach of the original sales contract. The buyer claimed damages for three
items: (1) the costs incurred in effecting cover;2 6 (2) the profits lost by di-
verting the buyer's manufacturing plant to processing ties for the resale
contract instead of manufacturing goods for other sales;2 7 (3) the profits
lost on the resale contract itself because of the higher cost of the ties used
as cover.
28
In a carefully reasoned opinion the court held that a seller could not
successfully raise a statute of frauds defense in the face of a confirming
letter sent by a buyer.29 The court pointed out that section 2.201(b) of the
Code makes an oral contract between merchants enforceable against the
recipient of a signed confirmation if the confirmation is sent within a rea-
sonable time, and no objection is made to it within ten days after receipt. 30
Furthermore, the court noted that, although a confirmation might satisfy
the statute of frauds, the Code required a further inquiry to determine
whether an oral contract existed and, if so, what the terms of the agree-
ment were. 3 ' Although the seller vigorously contested the sufficiency of
the evidence, the court concluded that an oral agreement had been made
and that the terms were sufficiently definite to permit enforcement. 32
A second issue the defendant raised was the legal propriety of the
buyer's various damage claims. On the claim for cover damages the court
held that, although section 2.712 speaks in terms of obtaining cover by the
purchase of substitute goods,33 a buyer could obtain cover by means of
internal manufacture. 34 On the facts of the Dura-Wood case, the court
26. The remedy of cover is provided for in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). The essence of this remedy is to permit a disappointed buyer to
purchase substitute goods and recover from the defaulting seller the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price. Id
27. Profits lost because of a seller's breach are recoverable within the limits stated by
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
28. See id
29. 675 F.2d at 749.
30. Id. at 748-49; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968):
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiv-
ing it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of Subsec-
tion (a) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is
given within ten days after it is received.
31. 675 F.2d at 749.
32. Id. at 750-52.
33. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
34. 675 F.2d at 754. On this point the court said: "It would defy reason and the Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code's purposes of flexibility and adaptation to reasonable commercial prac-
tice to require a buyer to increase losses by covering through the purchase of goods from
another seller, if it could produce the goods itself at a lower price." Id
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found that the buyer had acted reasonably and in good faith when it de-
cided to manufacture the necessary ties to cover its resale contract. 35 On
the claim for lost manufacturing profits, however, the court concluded that
the lost profits could have been avoided had the buyer covered by purchas-
ing substitute goods.36 Such a purchase would have left the buyer's manu-
facturing facility in a position to accept other contracts and minimize the
damages resulting from the seller's breach. The court, therefore, denied
recovery for lost manufacturing profits. 7 The court also denied the plain-
tiff's claim for lost resale profits.38 The court properly concluded that an
award of such profits would amount to a double recovery because the
buyer had already received contract/cover damages to put it in the posi-
tion it would have been in had the contract been fully performed. 39
Dura- Wood is worth close reading because of its careful analysis of sev-
eral Code provisions. If there is a flaw in the opinion, it is in the somewhat
inadequate explanation of how the buyer could act reasonably in electing
to manufacture goods for cover, but act unreasonably by the same act in
incurring a loss of manufacturing profits. Reasonableness can, of course,
vary in interpretation, depending on the subject of the inquiry, but a better
explanation of the court's reasoning could have provided useful guidance
to future buyers trying to choose the most effective means of cover.40
Dura- Wood teaches that a buyer should consider not only contract/cover
differentials, but also lost manufacturing profits when deciding whether to
buy or to manufacture substitute goods.
B. Performance Disputes
Unconscionability. An interesting fact situation involving the international
sale of natural gas by an American seller to a Mexican buyer provided the
Fifth Circuit with an opportunity to consider the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility in a commercial context.41 In 1968 the parties in Compania de Gas de
Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc. 42 amended a 1944 long-term export con-
tract to permit the automatic pass through of price increases or decreases
the suppliers charged to the American seller. No one objected to this
amendment until the buyer filed suit years later. The seller made sales
under the amended contract for several years charging pass through price
increases to the buyer from time to time. The price increases caused ar-
35. Id




40. A very similar situation involving the problem of effecting cover in a manner that
permits the recovery of consequential damages is thoroughly discussed in J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-7, at
196-206 (1972).
41. See Compania De Gas De Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1982). In addition to the commercial issues, the case discussed issues of collateral estoppel
and the application of the act of state doctrine. Discussion of these issues has been omitted
because they did not bear on the resolution of the commercial matters.
42. 686 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1982).
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
rearage to accumulate against the buyer. Ultimately, the seller threatened
to suspend deliveries unless the buyer paid the entire arrearage. At this
point the buyer filed suit in the U.S. federal court to enjoin the seller from
suspending deliveries and to challenge the validity of the pass through
charges. The buyer argued that the seller had unconscionably used the
pass through clause as a blank check for price increases. Under section
2.302 of the Code the issue of whether a contract clause is unconscionable
is an issue of law for the court.43 Unconscionability is, therefore, review-
able on appeal.
The court did not hesitate to apply section 2.302 to this case. It correctly
stated the basic test for unconscionability to be "whether, in light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particu-
lar trade or case, the clause involved is so one-sided as to be unconsciona-
ble under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract."" Applying this test, the court concluded that the pass through
clause was not unconscionable and had not been used by the seller in an
unconscionable manner. 45
C. Warranties
Proof of Warranty Breach. The question of express and implied warranties
was discussed during this survey period in Bormaster v. Henderson .46 The
Bormaster court held that, while both express and implied warranties had
arisen in the sale of a rare cockatoo, the purchaser failed to show that a
breach of warranty occurred. 47 The court correctly stated that the buyer
had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a
breach occurred at the time of sale in order to recover on either an express
or implied warranty theory.48
No Implied Warranty in Sale of Used Home. Section 2.314 of the Code
creates an implied warranty of merchantability for the sale of goods.49
While the Code is not applicable to the sale of realty, Texas has adopted
an implied warranty theory for the sale of homes on the ground that buy-
43. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states:
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
44. 686 F.2d at 328.
45. Id. The court concluded that the clause did not result in gross disparity between the
consideration and the amount paid. On the contrary, the court found that the pass through
charges brought the amount paid in line with the fair market value of the gas. Id
46. 624 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
47. Id at 661.
48. Id. at 660-61.
49. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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ers of houses, like buyers of goods, are entitled to minimum quality protec-
tions.5 0 Unfortunately for the buyers of both goods and houses, the lower
Texas courts have consistently refused to extend warranty protection to the
purchasers of used goods or used homes. 5'
The comments to section 2.314, while indicating a need for warranties
on used goods, clearly recognize that implied warranties for used goods
should be more limited than those for new goods.52 The Texas decisions,
however, have taken the view that no implied warranties should exist on
used goods. 53 These decisions appear to be unduly restrictive 54 and might
be wrong.55 The case of Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc. 56 illustrates the theo-
50. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1968). Implied warranties of
habitability were subsequently extended to the lessees of apartments or other dwellings. See
Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. 1978).
51. See, e.g., Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland
1981, no writ); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston I1st Dist.] 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 comment 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) pro-
vides: "A contract for the sale of second-hand goods, however, involves only such obliga-
tion as is appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description." Id
53. See, e.g., Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
54. It is difficult to understand why the mere fact of a first sale should completely erase
the possibility of any implied warranty when the goods are sold a second time by a profes-
sional seller. Subsequent sales sometimes occur while goods are still, for all practical pur-
poses, new goods. Implied warranties only attach when goods are sold by a professional in
the trade, and not when they are sold by a casual seller. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Comment 3 to section 2.314 of the Code states: "A
person making an isolated sale of goods is not a 'merchant' within the meaning of the full
scope of this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply." Id. comment
3. If the owner of an apartment is held to an implied warranty of habitability upon the
reletting of an apartment on the ground that a landlord is in a better position than a tenant
to know of latent defects because of greater knowledge and experience, see Kamarath v.
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. 1978), then a merchant who claims professional knowl-
edge of the goods being sold should also be in a better position to know of latent defects than
a buyer of the goods. Of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, only Texas holds
that no warranty of merchantability of any kind arises on the sale of used goods. See the
cases collected in 2A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CASE DIGEST § 2314.12(3) (1982 &
Supp. 1982).
55. Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, no writ), was the seminal case asserting that no implied warranties exist in
the sale of used goods under the Texas Code. Chaq Oil referred to section 2.314 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code and the comments thereto, but the court did not analyze the
statute to determine its meaning. Instead, the court adopted the position that pre-Code law
was still controlling, citing American Soda Found. Co. v. Palace Drug Store, 245 S.W. 1032
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1922, no writ), and Norvell-Wilder Supply Co. v. Richardson, 300
S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Subsequent decisions merely
cite Chaq Oil as controlling. See cases cited supra note 5 1. No Texas case has discussed the
underlying policy question of whether warranties of merchantability should exist on the sale
of used goods, nor has one directly addressed the plain language of section 2.314(a) of the
Texas Code, which states, "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (emphasis added). This
language is certainly susceptible to the interpretation that the Code imposes an implied war-
ranty on the sale of goods whether new or used and that pre-Code law is no longer control-
1983]
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retical thicket into which the lower courts have wandered by following the
shibboleth of no implied warranties on used goods or on used homes.
In Gupta the second owner of a used home brought suit against the orig-
inal homebuilder on theories of implied warranty and negligence. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the homebuilder on both theo-
ries. On appeal the court cited two earlier civil appeals decisions holding
that no implied warranties exist in the sale of used homes57 and concluded
that the instant case fell within the same rule.5 8 The appeals court af-
firmed the summary judgment on the implied warranty issue. 59
On the negligence theory the court decided that privity was not required
between the second buyer and the homebuilder and that a negligence
claim might lie.60 The court, therefore, remanded the case for trial on the
negligence issue.61 In support of this ruling the court cited Nobility Homes
of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers,62 an implied warranty case, for the proposition
that privity was not necessary in negligence actions. The interplay be-
tween theories of negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability in tort is
well documented in the sale of goods arena,63 and, if Gupta is any indica-
tion, the same interplay is beginning to operate in cases involving the sale
of homes. Rather than simply denying that implied warranties can ever
exist in the sale of used goods or used homes, a better jurisprudential ap-
proach would be to recognize that implied warranties can exist in such
sales and focus judicial consideration on whether particular defects should
fall within the scope of such an implied warranty. 64
ling. See, e.g., Brown v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454 (Fla. App. 1969) (purchaser of used dump
truck relied on seller's skill and judgment in selection; implied warranty arose); Perry v.
Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458 (Okla. 1980) (pre-purchase examination of used
combine could not have revealed defects; warranty implied); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Olds-
mobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976) (buyer's inspection of used auto, though
specially equipped, did not raise suspicion of its use as a race car and did not waive implied
warranty).
The Texas Supreme Court may agree that used goods should carry warranties appropri-
ately limited in scope. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv.,
Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978). For further discussion, see Krahmer, supra note 13, at
198-99.
56. 633 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ granted).
57. The court cited Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Ct. App.-
Eastland 1981, no writ), and Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 633 S.W.2d at 627.
58. 633 S.W.2d at 627-28.
59. Id at 626.
60. Id at 628.
61. Id
62. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
63. See, e.g., Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978);
Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.
1978) (both discussing the historical interaction of these theories). Professor-Grant Gilmore
has suggested that the law on this subject has progressed to the point at which traditional
tort/contract distinctions have been abandoned, and we now have a cause of action that he
calls a "contort." G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974).
64. This is the approach taken by courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Richards v.
Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. App. 1979) (no implied warranty ex-
tended to observable cracks in gel coat); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 296 A.2d




Breach of Warranty-Pleading and Proof of Damages. In Simmons v.
Simpson 65 a plaintiff-buyer brought suit on theories of breach of express
and implied warranties. The plaintiff introduced proof as to the cost of
repairs made to the goods in order to bring them up to the standard re-
quired under the contract. The jury rendered a verdict and the court en-
tered a judgment in favor of the buyer. On appeal the court held that a
fatal variance existed between the pleading and proof because the proper
measure of damage for breach of warranty is not the cost of repair, but the
difference in market value between the goods delivered and the goods as
represented.66 Because the pleadings did not seek damages for the cost of
repairs and because no evidence had been introduced to prove market
value of the goods, the appeals court reversed the judgment for the plain-
tiff and rendered a new judgment in favor of the defendant/seller. 67
Breach of Warranty of Title-Constructive Trust. The buyer in Powell, Inc.
v. Abney 68 recovered a judgment against the seller for breach of warranty
of title and sought to avoid the discharge of a constructive trust lien on the
seller's homestead. In the district court the buyer obtained a judgment for
$115,000 for the seller's knowing breach of an implied warranty of title.
The judgment traced $27,000 of the price paid for the goods into the
seller's homestead and the district court imposed an equitable lien on the
homestead to secure it. After entry of the judgment the defendant moved
to discharge the lien by paying $27,000 into court and the court granted the
motion.69 On appeal the buyer argued that the equitable lien should not
have been discharged in light of the wrongful conduct of the defendant.
The Fifth Circuit agreed, saying "[tihe discharge of the lien rewards [the
seller] for the disposal-in a manner successfully frustrating tracing--of
the monies he acquired from [the buyer] . . . .He who comes into the
court seeking equity, must do so with clean hands and in turn must be
prepared to do equity. [The seller] has done neither."'70 The court refused
to order the discharge of the lien.7'
thetic items); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349
(1976) (implied warranty in used goods directed to operative essentials).
65. 626 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
66. Id. at 317. The leading case on pleading and proof of damages for breach of war-
ranty is Kissman v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc., 587 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1979). A fatal vari-
ance between pleading and proof in regard to repair costs was found to exist in Kissman. Id
at 677.
67. 626 S.W.2d at 317.
68. 669 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1982).
69. Id.
70. Id at 350.
71. Id
1983]
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III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
Instruments Payable Jointly to More than One Payee. In Johnson v. Cox 
72
Cox obtained a default judgment against the maker of a note payable to
the order of Paul Cox and Dan M. Bates for one-half the face amount of
the note. Bates was not a party to the suit. On appeal from the default
judgment the court of appeals referred to section 3.116 of the Code73 and
held that Bates was an indispensable party to the suit because the note was
payable jointly and not in the alternative. 74 The court of appeals stated
that it was fundamental error for the trial court to have proceeded without
the joinder of Bates,75 citing the earlier section 3.116 decision of Hinojosa
v. Love.76 The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case. 77
On appeal the Texas Supreme Court refused to grant writ of error, but
stated that the doctrine of fundamental or unassigned error was a discred-
ited and very limited doctrine that was not applicable to this case.78 The
supreme court held that failure to join Bates was not fundamental error
because his absence would not deprive the court of jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate the merits of the controversy. 79 Thus, the supreme court expressly
disapproved the court of appeals decisions in Johnson and Hinojosa.80
The high court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a
new trial, however, because the maker had raised other meritorious de-
fenses in his appeal.8' The supreme court did not explain how the trial
court was to proceed under a statutory standard that says an instrument
payable jointly to two or more persons can be "enforced only by all of
them." 82
B. Liability of Parties
Signatures in Representative Capacity. Section 3.403 of the Code presumes
a signature to be in a representative capacity when the name of an organi-
zation is preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
individual.8 3 This presumption arose in Barclay v. Epic Associates XXIV8
4
when a party signed a note "De Cra Homes /s/ Maurice L. Barclay; Mau-
72. 630 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam,
638 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1982).
73. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.116 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states: "An in-
strument payable to the order of two or more persons ... (2) if not in the alternative is
payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them."
74. 630 S.W.2d at 493.
75. Id
76. 496 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
77. 630 S.W.2d at 493.




82. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.116(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The text of
this section is set out supra note 73.
83. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.403(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
84. 631 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
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rice L. Barclay, President." The court of appeals held that the note itself,
when read in light of section 3.403, showed that Barclay signed in a repre-
sentative capacity, absent proof overcoming the statutory presumption.8 5
Liability for Attorneys' Fees. The appeals courts decided a pair of cases8 6
during the survey period on the issue of attorneys' fees assessed as part of
the cost of collecting overdue notes. In Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden8 7
the maker of a note paid the entire balance demanded on an overdue note
to avoid foreclosure on certain oil and gas properties. The ampunt in-
cluded $61,000 in attorneys' fees, an amount calculated as ten percent of
the balance due under the terms of the note. The maker subsequently filed
suit to recover allegedly unreasonable attorneys' fees. The case would
have been a rather simple one had the maker resisted making the payment
initially and challenged the reasonableness of the fees immediately.8 8 Be-
cause this was not done, and the plaintiff questioned the reasonableness of
the fees after he had paid them, the court of appeals attempted to develop
rules to govern such post-payment challenges. The court essentially cre-
ated a four-step procedure for such a post-payment challenge to attorneys'
fees collected pursuant to the terms of a promissory note.8 9
The plaintiff must first plead and prove that he paid the fee involuntarily
or, alternatively, that he did not, by paying, intend to waive his claim that
the fees were unreasonable. 90 Secondly, he must show that the attorneys'
fees he paid were unreasonable, and, thirdly, he must prove the amount
that would have been reasonable under the circumstances.9' The court's
fourth rule requires the plaintiff to plead and prove duress, fraud, or com-
pulsion if he fails to prove that he paid the fee involuntarily or that he did
not intend to waive his claim.92 The court held that a demand for payment
of attorneys' fees in the percentage specified in the note, while perhaps
unreasonable, was not illegal or wrongful. 93 In such circumstances the
court concluded that duress did not exist as a matter of law.94
In another decision the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that an
attorney who conducted foreclosure proceedings on behalf of the holder of
a real estate lien note was not in privity with the obligors on the note. 95
Because privity did not exist, the obligors could not recover against the
attorney for alleged unreasonable attorneys' fees charged in the foreclo-
85. Id. at 545.
86. Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ);
Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
87. 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. Id at 134.




93. Id at 135.
94. Id
95. Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ).
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sure proceedings.96
C. Enforcement and Defenses
Reformation of Instruments. Parol evidence is not ordinarily admissible to
vary the terms of a note unless there is a showing that the transferee, by
some trickery, artifice, or device, fraudulently induced the transferor to
sign the instrument. 97 A mere representation that the transferor will not be
liable on the instrument is not sufficient to show fraud in the inducement. 98
According to the court in First National Bank v. Jones,99 however, the ordi-
nary rule excluding parol evidence is not applicable when the transferor
seeks to reform an instrument to reflect the actual intent of the parties.l°0
In Jones the defendant-transferor indorsed three notes to the plaintiff
bank as a representative of his insurance agency. The defendant alleged
that he had also been asked to sign his name a second time on the notes
"for the purpose of identifying himself with his agency." '0' The defendant
asked that the notes be reformed on the ground of mutual mistake. He
maintained that the parties' true agreement was that he would not be per-
sonally liable on the instruments. Alternatively, the defendant urged the
court to admit parol evidence because of the fraud or inequitable conduct
of the bank. The court agreed with the defendant on both grounds and
ruled that the trial court properly admitted the parol evidence.' 0 2 The
bank contended that it was a holder in due course of the notes and, as
such, entitled to judgment on the notes as a matter of law.10 3 On this point
the court correctly ruled that, even if the bank did qualify as a holder in
due course, it would still be subject to the transferee's defenses because of
the dealings between the parties.1°4
Discharge by Cancellation of Instrument. Under section 3.605 the holder of
an instrument can discharge a party by intentionally cancelling the instru-
ment or by returning the instrument to the party being discharged. 5 Gi-
96. Id at 183-84.
97. Town N. Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978). The appeals court
applied the ordinary parol evidence rule during the survey period in Bailey v. Gulfway Nat'l
Bank, 626 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
98. Town N. Nat'l Bank v Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. 635 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
100. Id at 951.
101. Id
102. Id. at 953.
103. Id.
104. Id; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(b) (lex. UCC) (Vernon 1968): "To
the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from...
(b) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt." (emphasis
added).
105. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
(a) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration discharge
any party
(1) in any manner apparent on the face of the instrument or the indorse-
ment, as by intentionally cancelling the instrument or the party's sig-
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bralter Savings Association v. Watson '06 illustrates the application of these
discharge rules. In Watson the payee mistakenly credited $9100 to the
makers' account. This error caused the balance due on the note to be
$9100 too low. The makers paid the amount the note showed to be the
balance due and the payee marked the note paid, delivering it to the mak-
ers. After discovering the error the payee demanded payment of the defi-
ciency, but the demands were unsatisfied. Litigation followed.
In a carefully reasoned opinion the Watson court held that a discharge
under section 3.605 would occur only when the payee acted intention-
ally. '0 7 The mistake in calculation obviated any intention to discharge the
makers and, despite the marking and returning of the note, the makers
remained liable for the $9100 balance due on the instrument.108 This deci-
sion is consistent with the language of section 3.605 and with decisions
under that section in other jurisdictions.' 0 9
Discharge by Tender of Payment. Section 3.604 discharges a party to an
instrument from subsequent liability for interest, costs, and attorneys' fees
if he tenders full payment to the holder."I 0 The holder's refusal to accept
such tender wholly discharges any party who has a right of recourse
against the party making the tender.Il' The Texas Supreme Court applied
section 3.604 in Guaranty Bank v. Thompson. 1 2 The court determined that
the maker of a note and a party with a right of recourse against the maker
had a meritorious discharge defense in an action by the holder of the note
because of the holder's refusal of a tender of full payment." 13 The court
reached the same decision in a companion case consolidated for appeal. 14
Agreement Permitting Release of Collateral, Section 3.606 of the Code dis-
charges from liability a party with a right of recourse on an instrument if
collateral is released without the party's consent. 115 The official comments
to section 3.606 point out that a party may consent to the release of collat-
eral in advance, and the consent may be incorporated into the instru-
nature by destruction or mutilation, or by striking out the party's
signature; or
(2) by renouncing his rights by a writing signed and delivered or by
surrender of the instrument to the party to be discharged.
(b) Neither cancellation nor renunciation without surrender of the instru-
ment affects the title thereto.
106. 624 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
107. Id at 652; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
108. 624 S.W.2d at 654.
109. See, e.g., First Galesburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 58 In. App. 3d 113, 373
N.E.2d 1075 (1978); Peoples Bank v. Robinson, 272 S.C. 155, 249 S.E.2d 784 (1978); Reid v.
Cramer, 24 Wash. App. 742, 603 P.2d 851 (1979).
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.604(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Il. Id § 3.604(b).
112. 632 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1982),
113. Id at 340.
114. Guaranty Bank v. O'Dowd, 632 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1982).
115. TEX. Bus. & CoM. COIE ANN. § 3.606 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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ment."16 The Tyler court of appeals construed section 3.606 in Lawyers
Title Insurance Corp. v. Northeast Texas Development Co. 17 In that cage a
guarantee clause stated: " 'This guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee,
and the liability of the guarantors hereunder shall in no way be affected,
modified or diminished .. .by reason of any substitution or release of
security, whether or not notice thereof is given to the guarantors.' ,18
Based on this language the court held that the release of a deed of trust
securing a note did not discharge the guarantors.' 19 The guarantee clause
amounted to an effective consent to the release of collateral under section
3.606.
IV. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. Payor Banks
Bank's Right to Recover Funds Paid by Mistake. Section 4.403 of the Code
gives a bank customer the right to stop payment on a check by giving ap-
propriate notice to the drawee bank. 20 If the bank mistakenly pays a
check over a stop order the bank has three subrogation rights under section
4.407 to prevent unjust enrichment and to avoid loss to the bank.' 2' In
addition to the subrogation rights stated in the Code, a bank has the com-
mon law remedy of restitution for money paid by mistake against the per-
son who received payment.' 22 The most difficult question is the
determination of the scope of the bank's common law right of restitution.
In Bryan v. Citizens National Bank 123 the Texas Supreme Court answered
116. Id. comment 2.
117. 635 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
118. Id. at 899.
119. Id
120. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
121. Id. § 4.407. The three subrogation rights are outlined in the following terms:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer
or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the
drawer or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent neces-
sary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor
bank shall be subrogated to the rights
(1) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker;
and
(2) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer or
maker either on the item or under the transaction out of which the
item arose; and
(3) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the
item with respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
Id
122. Id. comment 5. Comment 5 following § 4.407 provides:
The spelling out of the affirmative rights of the bank in this section does not
destroy other existing rights (Section 1-103). Among others these may in-
clude the defense of a payor bank that by conduct in recognizing the payment
a customer has ratified the bank's action in paying in disregard of a stop pay-
ment order or rights to recover money paid under a mistake.
Id (emphasis added).
123. 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982).
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that question and, in so doing, considerably narrowed the bank's restitutio-
nary right as it existed in pre-Code Texas law.
In Bryan the court held that a bank may assert a claim for restitution
against a holder who receives a mistaken payment only if the bank in-
troduces evidence to show that its customer had a defense against payment
of the check.' 24 Once it is shown that a defense exists the holder has the
burden of proving holder in due course status. 25 Unless it can be shown
that a defense exists the holder is presumed to be a holder in due course
126
and is protected against recovery of the mistaken payment by the final
payment rule of section 3.418.127 Under the pre-Code Texas rule a show-
ing that the bank made a mistaken payment immediately shifted the bur-
den to the holder to prove that he was a holder in due course.' 28 The
supreme court in Bryan specifically abandoned this pre-Code rule and
overruled the cases on which it was based. 129 The court reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals in Bryan, 130 which the appeals court had based
on the pre-Code rule, and remanded the case for a new trial.' 3 '
Accountability of Payor Bank for Late Return of Item. In Union Bank v.
First National Bank ' 32 the Fifth Circuit held a payor bank accountable for
violating the midnight deadline rule of section 4.302133 by failing to timely
return several dishonored checks. 134 In a subsequent appeal of the same
case the Fifth Circuit held the payor bank liable for prejudgment interest
124. Id. at 762.
125. Id at 763-64.
126. Id. at 763.
127. Id. Section 3.418 of the Texas Code provides:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the chapter on Bank
Deposits and Collections (Chapter 4) and except for liability for breach of
warranty on presentment under the preceding section, payment or acceptance
of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who
has in good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.418 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
128. Central Nat'l Bank v. Martin, 396 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ
dism'd w.o.j.); First-Wichita Nat'l Bank v. Steed, 374 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1964, no writ); Capital Nat'l Bank v. Wootton, 369 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1963, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
129. 628 S.W.2d at 762. In its opinion the court stated:
These three cases, [cited supra note 128] along with the opinion of the court of
civil appeals in the present case, appear to be the only decisions in any state
which allow a bank to recover on the mere showing of mistaken payment and
place the burden upon the payee to show he was a holder in due course.I.
130. See Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 621 S.W.2d 761, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1981).
131. 628 S.W.2d at 764.
132. 621 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1980).
133. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section
4.302 holds a bank accountable for the amount of any demand item when the item is re-
tained beyond midnight on the same banking day or does not pay, return, or notify of dis-
honor until after the midnight deadline or any other properly payable item unless it is
accepted, paid, or returned within the time allowable for acceptance or payment of that
item.
134. 621 F.2d 790 at 796. The case is discussed in Krahmer, supra note 13, at 213.
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from the time that the bank became accountable for the amount of the
delayed items until the date of judgment.135
Duty of Customer to Examine Returned Items. Section 4.406 requires a
customer to examine his statement and returned checks and report any
forgeries or alterations within fourteen days after the statement and items
are made available to the customer. 136 If a customer fails to report forger-
ies or alterations within the fourteen-day period the customer is precluded
from asserting subsequent forgeries or alterations by the same wrongdoer
against the payor bank. 137 In Ju-Nel Homes v. White Rock Bank13 8 the
Dallas court of appeals precluded a customer, who failed to examine state-
ments or report forgeries for a period of almost one year, from asserting
any forgeries by the same wrongdoer occurring after the initial fourteen-
day period. 139 The failure to examine and report forgeries resulted in a
loss to the customer of over $12,000.
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Validity of Security Agreement
Waiver of Defenses Clauses Invalid. Section 9.206 of the Code permits a
debtor to waive the right to assert any claims or defenses that he might
have against the assignee of a security agreement. 140 The section expressly
provides that its provisions are "[slubject to any statute or decision which
establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." 41 In
Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp. ,142 a case of first impression,
the Texas Supreme Court ruled "that article 5069-7.07(6) [of the Consumer
Credit Code] forbids the waiver of any claim or defense a buyer might
have against a seller or a holder.' 43 In effect, Texas now has an adjudi-
cated statute that reverses the effect of section 9.206 in consumer cases.
B. Priorities
Airplanes and Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business. Airplanes and
other forms of aircraft present special problems in the law of secured trans-
actions. A security interest in an airplane is perfected by recording the
135. 677 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1982).
136. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(a)-(i) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
137. Id. § 4.406(b).
138. 632 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
139. Id. at 650.
140. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.206 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
141. Id § 9.206(a).
142. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
143. 627 S.W.2d at 388 (emphasis in original); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-7.07(6) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The case also raised issues under art. 5069, ch. 14
of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which was repealed by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 672,
§ 51, at 1595, and under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, codified at TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). 627 S.W.2d at 384. Discussion of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
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security agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration, 1'" not by
filing a financing statement under the Code. 45 The federal statute, how-
ever, does not explicitly state any priority rules and the courts are split on
whether federal law implicitly governs priority disputes by establishing a
recording system or, in the absence of express priority rules, state law
should be used to determine priority disputes. 46
In Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp. 147 the Fifth Circuit
faced, for the first time, the question of whether state or federal law should
govern the priority of security interests in airplanes. In Gary the secured
creditor, General Dynamics, properly perfected a security interest in sev-
eral airplanes owned by its debtor by filing with the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration. A clause in the security agreement authorized the debtor to
sell the airplanes unless the debtor defaulted on its obligations to General
Dynamics. The debtor defaulted, contrary to the terms of the security
agreement, and sold four of the secured airplanes to Arthur Stewart, who
did not check the federal records before buying the planes. Stewart, Presi-
dent of Gary Aircraft Corp., subsequently learned of the pre-existing se-
curity interest but, despite this knowledge, transferred two of the airplanes
to Gary Aircraft Corp., apparently without consideration. Gary Aircraft
Corp. subsequently filed for chapter XI reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The priority dispute before the circuit court arose between
Gary and General Dynamics in the bankruptcy proceedings.
After reviewing numerous cases' 48 and considering the legislative his-
tory and policies underlying the federal registration system, the Fifth Cir-
cuit adopted the view that federal law governs only the recordation of
security interests and that state law governs questions of priority. 149 This
conclusion did not entirely resolve the case because General Dynamics
claimed that under Texas law' 50 it had priority over the ostensible owner
of the airplanes, Gary Aircraft. The court held that Stewart, the first pur-
chaser of the planes, qualified as a buyer in the ordinary course of business
under section 9.307151 and took the planes free of the General Dynamics
security interest.'5 2 The court further held that Stewart had no duty to
check for recorded security interests in the planes because the relevant test
144. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
145. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983): "The filing of a financing statement ... is not necessary or effective to perfect a
security interest in property subject to (I) a statute or treaty of the United States ......
146. Compare Dowel v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971) (federal law governs priorities), with Sanders
v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978) (state law governs priority dis-
putes). The cases on both sides of this interpretive split are collected in Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d
1273 (1968 & Supp. 1982).
147. 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982).
148. The court cited cases at supra note 146.
149. 681 F.2d at 372.
150. The relevant law was TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-.507 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
151. Id § 9.307.
152. 681 F.2d at 373-74.
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was whether Stewart acted in good faith. 53 Only if Stewart had actual
knowledge of facts or circumstances that amounted to bad faith would he
lose the status of a buyer in the ordinary course of business and no such
facts were shown.' 54 Because Gary Aircraft traced its title through Stew-
art, who had taken free of the security interest, Gary was likewise free of
General Dynamics' claim. 55 This result obtained even though Gary paid
no consideration for the airplane. 56
Continuation of Perfection and Priorities in Sold Collateral. In In re Mc-
Bee 157 the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas decided
several issues of interest in the secured transactions area. First, the court
determined that a filed financing statement bearing only the trade name of
a debtor was not effective to perfect a security interest. 5 8 Secondly, the
court decided that a secured creditor need not file an amended financing
statement within four months after the transfer of a debtor's inventory as
section 9.402 normally requires.' 59 The court reached this conclusion be-
cause section 6.111 permits a creditor to avoid a bulk transfer for up to six
months after the transfer occurs. 160 The court reasoned that bulk transfers
represented an exception to the four-month rule of section 9.402.161 Fi-
nally, the bankruptcy court resolved a priority conflict between two se-
cured parties holding perfected security interests in the inventory and
account of a bulk transferee by referring to the first to file under section
9.312(e).' 62 The McBee case merits careful reading, particularly on the
section 9.402 point. No other Texas cases construe the statutory language
the court interprets in the McBee decision, and the case, therefore, may be
a useful precedent for the commercial law attorney.
C Proceedings After Default
No Election of Remedies Doctrine Under the Code. In Bennett v. State Na-
tionalBank' 63 the court held that section 9.501 '64 permits a secured party
153. Id. at 375-76.
154. Id. at 376.
155. Id. at 377.
156. Id. On this point the court said: "We cannot imagine applying any rule other than
that a donee takes the title that his donor had." Id
157. 20 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982).
158. Id. at 363-64.
159. Id at 364-67; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(g) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
160. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Chapter 6 of the
Code deals with bulk transfers and the rights of creditors of the transferee. Id §§ 6.101 -
.111.
161. 20 Bankr. at 365-66; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(g) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
162. 20 Bankr. at 368; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983) (provides that conflicting security interests are ranked according to prior-
ity in time of filing or perfection).
163. 623 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
164. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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to sue on an outstanding debt without first foreclosing on collateral. 165
The secured party may pursue any remedy or combination of remedies
that may be legally available to him. ' 66 The Code does not require a party
to elect between several possible remedies. 67
Repossession and Venue-National Banks. University National Bank v. Mc-
Farland168 presented the question of self-help repossession. The court
held that a self-help repossession by a national bank did not waive the
bank's right to be sued in the county where it was located rather than in
the county where the repossession occurred.169 The decision is consistent
with earlier Texas cases on the same issue. 170
Improper Resale Bars Recovery of Deficiency. Section 9.504 of the Code
establishes two basic standards to govern the resale of collateral: (1) No-
tice of the sale must be given to the debtor; and (2) the sale must be con-
ducted in a commercially reasonable manner.' 7 ' In Tanenbaum v.
Economics Laboratory, Inc. 172 the Texas Supreme Court held that this sec-
tion bars a secured party who failed to comply with either or both of these
basic standards from recovering any deficiency that remained on the debt
after completing the sale of collateral. 173 The decision is an important one
because it reverses several lower court decisions that had adopted a differ-
ent rule. 74 Every commercial lawyer should read Tanenbaum. The court
in Gentry v. Highlands State Bank 75 applied the Tanenbaum rule. In Gen-
try the Houston [14th District] court of appeals held that a secured creditor
must establish that notice of the sale was given before the creditor can
recover a deficiency in a summary judgment proceeding. 76
Conversion Action Lies for Wrongful Repossession. Section 9.507 provides
a debtor with remedies for injunctive relief or damages if a secured credi-
165. 623 S.W.2d at 721.
166. Id
167. Id
168. 635 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
169. Id. at 202. The right of a bank to be sued in the county of its location is established
by the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1945). The venue provisions have been substan-
tially amended by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1469 (Oct. 15, 1982).
170. See Robertson v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 561 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rivera v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 547 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
171. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
172. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
173. Id at 772.
174. 1d;see Roylex, Inc. v. E.F. Johnson Co., 617 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Ward v. First State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1980), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Dec. 31, 1980); Tackett v.
Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
refd n.r.e.); O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 832 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975),
rev'don other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1977).
175. 633 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d).
176. Id at 592.
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tor fails to properly proceed with the repossession or disposition of collat-
eral. 177 The Code does not, however, prohibit an action for common law
conversion. 178 In Wilson v. First National Bank 179 a debtor successfully
sued a secured creditor for the conversion of a tractor. The court calcu-
lated the damages as the value of the goods at the time of the wrongful
repossession less the amount the secured party credited on the debtor's
account from the proceeds of resale.' 80 The Waco court also allowed ex-
emplary damages. '8'
177. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of this subchapter disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor
or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made
known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of
the subchapter. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to
recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten
per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus
ten per cent of the cash price.
178. See id. § 9.505(a) (specifically mentions action for conversion as a possible remedy).
179. 635 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
180. Id at 890.
181. Id
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